After the Japanese annexation in 1910, Korea became a forgotten nation in the international community. When the nationalist movement brought about open resistance to colonial rule in 1919, Western powers regarded it as an internal affair of Japan and did not show any official response to the Koreans’ appeal. However, following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in December, 1941, the Allied Powers, including the United States, began to re-examine their Korean policy.
During the Pacific War, the international discussions on the Korean problem were held at two levels. First, at the government level, the discussions concerning the future status of Korea took place among the Allied leaders at the various conferences of Cairo, Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam. Thus, the heads of the United States, United Kingdom, Republic of China, and the Soviet Union reached agreement on the establishment of a joint trusteeship over Korea after the war. Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had the leading role in drawing up this agreement, felt that “the Koreans are not yet capable of exercising and maintaining independent government and that they should be placed under a 40-year tutelage.”1 Roosevelt’s idea on trusteeship over colonial territories, like Woodrow Wilson’s mandate concept, was inspired both by the expansive needs of American capitalism and by his own liberal-internationalist ideology.2 Extensive research on these matters has already been conducted.3
Second, at a private level, the Korean problem was actively discussed in the conferences of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR, 1925–1960), which is considered to have been an institutional precursor of today’s international non-governmental organizations specializing in problems in the Asia-Pacific region.4 The Institute was at the height of its political influence during the Pacific War and played a vital role as the Allied countries’ wartime “think-tank” or “unofficial diplomatic channel.” In its international conferences (Mont Tremblant, Quebec, Canada, 1942; Hot Springs, Virginia, U.S., 1945), decolonization was the most controversial issue because it was central to defining not only the war ideology, but also the nature of the postwar world order.5 The Korean agenda was treated in relation to the future of the occupied areas of Japan, and all options, including the immediate independence of Korea after the defeat of Japan, were on the table. However, there has been still no proper research on this subject.
This study first describes what kind of an organization the Institute of Pacific Relations was, and then goes into the details of the diverse views on the future of Korea in its international conferences. It reveals that finding a solution to the Korean problem during the Pacific War was a complex and delicate issue. This was because the Allied Powers, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and the Soviet Union, had quite different interests in Korea due to the geopolitical location of the Korean Peninsula. (Just half a century before, Japan had waged wars against China and Russia to occupy Korea.) Even though the IPR was “one of the premier non-governmental organizations operating at the international level for much of the early twentieth century,”6 intellectuals from countries who were involved in the activities of this organization could not be free from the interests of their home country. A closer look at the activities of the IPR also discloses an interesting aspect about the relationship between the state and intellectuals in the interwar period. The IPR documents in the archives of the University of Hawai‘i, Columbia University in New York, and the University of British Columbia in Vancouver are the primary sources.7
1Department of State, U.S., United States Policy Regarding Korea, 1834–1950 (Chuncheon: Insititute of Asian Culture Studies, Hallym University, 1987), 86. 2Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), 104–109. 3See ibid, Chapter 3; Soon Sung Cho, Korea in World Politics, 1940–1950: An Evaluation of American Responsibility (Berkeley and Los Angles: University of California Press, 1967); James Irving Matray,The Reluctant Crusade : American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941–1950 (Honolulu : University of Hawaii Press, 1985); Tae-yŏl Ku, Han’guk kukche kwan’gyesa yŏn’gu [A study on the history of Korea’s international relations], 2 (Sŏul: Yŏksa Pip’yŏngsa, 1995); Yong-uk Chŏng, Haebang chŏnhu Miguk ŭi taehan chŏngch’aek [United States policy toward Korea before and after the Liberation], (Sŏul: Sŏul Taehakkyo Ch’ulp’anbu, 2003). 4As regards the historiography of the Institute of Pacific Relations, refer to Yutaka Sasaki, “The Struggle for Scholarly Objectivity: Unofficial Diplomacy and the Institute of Pacific Relations from the Sino-Japanese War to the McCarthy Era,” Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey-New Brunswick, 2005, 22–31. 5For details, see ibid., Chapter 3–5; Tomoko Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific: the United States, Japan, and the Institute of Pacific Relations in War and Peace, 1919–45 (London & New York: Routledge, 2002), Chapter 9; Alan Raucher, “The First Foreign Affairs Think Tanks,” American Quarterly, 30-4 (Autumn 1978), 493–513; Christopher G. Thorne, Allies of a Kind: the United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1941–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 209–214. 6Lawrence T. Woods, “Letters in Support of the Institute of Pacific Relations: Defending a Nongovernmental Organization,” Pacific Affairs, 76-4 (Winter 2003/2004), 611. 7William L. Holland, “Source Materials on the Institute of Pacific Relations,” Pacific Affairs, 58-1 (Spring 1985), 91–97.
THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS IN WARTIME
The Institute of Pacific Relations was founded in 1925 in Hawai‘i by the initiative of American intellectuals, then “only a few far-sighted people,” who realized the need for greater knowledge and understanding of the Asia-Pacific region. They were in a sense “Asia Firsters” who believed that the material prosperity and democracy of America would depend on its expansion to foreign countries, especially into Asia via the Pacific Ocean. The IPR was designed as an unofficial, international, non-partisan association of private national societies in the countries located in or having interests in the Pacific area. Its object, as stated in its constitution, was “to study the conditions of the Pacific peoples with a view to the improvement of their mutual relations.”8
In the mid-1930s, the IPR consisted of the following national councils:
Each national council was autonomous with its own distinctive organization and program. All of them were devoted to research, discussion, and publication on the political, economic, and diplomatic problems of the Far East and the Pacific. They stood for “objective fact-finding,” “free discussion” in which many view points were represented, and the dissemination of reliable, up-to-date information on contemporary problems. The international governing body of the IPR was the Pacific Council, consisting of one member appointed by each national council. The International Secretariat, under the direction of the Pacific Council, maintained liaison among the national councils to coordinate their activities. It also published an international quarterly review,
The IPR’s activities consisted of two closely related parts: (1) an international conference held at two or three year intervals, and (2) a variety of research programs on both the national and international level, which were closely integrated with the international conference. Overall, it should be stressed that at a time when Asian studies were still in the nascent stage in most Pacific countries, the IPR single-handedly took on the task of producing studies, promoting unofficial discussions, and disseminating information related to a variety of problems in the Pacific region.11
Even though the IPR was an international body composed of eleven national councils, the American Council and the International Secretariat, both based in New York after 1933, actually led the organization. Meanwhile, with the Great Depression and New Deal policy of the 1930s, some liberal or progressive intellectuals had a predominant role in the American IPR. Three intellectuals, namely Edward C. Carter (1878–1954), Owen Lattimore (1900–1989), and Frederick V. Field (1905–2000), are especially worth noting. As Secretary General of the International Secretariat from 1933 to 1946, Carter contributed greatly to the enhancement of the IPR’s global positioning. Lattimore, a self-educated expert on China and Central Asia, joined the IPR as the editor of
The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 posed a sharp challenge to the IPR because it seemed to make a mockery of the previous efforts of the organization, dedicated as they had been to improving diplomacy in the Pacific.14 The International Secretariat launched a special research project to investigate the causes of the conflict and to propose a method of peaceful settlement in the Far East. This project was met with strong opposition from the Japanese Council, which feared that the project would necessarily develop “anti-Japanese” sen-timents. Leading members of the Japanese Council argued that dealing with such a “hot and controversial” political issue would violate the fundamental principles that should govern the activities of the IPR, that is to say “nonpartisanship” and “objectivity.”15 Nevertheless, in the following years, numerous volumes on the background and probable consequences of the Sino-Japanese War appeared as part of the IPR “Inquiry Series,” which was aided by a special grant from the Rockefeller Foundation and was supported by all of the IPR national councils except the Japanese Council.16
The outbreak of the Pacific War on December 7, 1941, was the beginning of “the most eventful period in IPR history.” On that day, the war in the Far East merged with the conflict in Europe to become World War II.17 Millions of people around the world came to realize that the Pacific Ocean must be taken just as seriously as the Atlantic Ocean. In other words, in a single afternoon, Pearl Harbor dramatically proved the basic thesis of the IPR: “the Pacific
The new emergency demands raised the question of whether the IPR should reconsider its program and change its whole emphasis. With regard to this matter, Ray Lyman Wilbur, Chairperson of the American Council, announced:
In support of this aim, the American Council used its full resources. As “the foremost private center of Far Eastern and Pacific studies in the world,” the IPR proved to be a storehouse of specialized knowledge, materials, and people.20 These resources were vital, not only in the task of winning the war, but also in postwar reconstruction. The American government utilized the IPR members in two major areas: publicity or wartime propaganda, and policy analysis and formulation. This state co-option was also evident in other countries. In Britain, the headquarters of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) was moved to Oxford for intelligence work with other government departments, and a government grant was provided for RIIA activities.21
Because of the presence of so many members of other councils in wartime Washington, the Pacific Council established an office in Washington in co-operation with the American Council. This office had as its chief purpose close liaison between the staffs of the two Councils and the government agencies concerned with the Far East, the Embassies and the war missions of the other United Nations. The second function of the office was to facilitate a series of study groups on Pacific problems, utilizing the great concentration of competent experts now in Washington. The first in this series was a study group on China’s postwar economic problems, which drew together a number of Chinese and American experts from New York and Washington.22
It should be noted here that Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek approached the IPR during the Pacific War. In August 1943, Secretary General Carter received an urgent and unsolicited invitation from Generalissimo Chiang to come at once to Chungking for the specific purpose of building and strengthening the Chinese IPR.23 Upon arrival in Chungking, Carter was received with exquisite courtesy. The Generalissimo started off with five “rapid-fire” questions:
We do not know Carter’s answers to these questions. However, it is certain that Generalissimo Chiang was anxious to know American and British public opinion and government policies toward the postwar Asia-Pacific region, especially colonial countries like India and Korea.
8American Institute of Pacific Relations, Understanding Asia: The Aims and Work of the Institute of Pacific Relations (New York: American Council, 1951), 10–11. 9For the details of each national council at the outbreak of the Pacific War, refer to Institute of Pacific Relations, “Interim Report of the International Secretariat, 1939–1942,” IPR Fonds in the University of British Columbia Archives (IPR Fonds-UBCA), box 45-4. 10American IPR, Understanding Asia, 8. 11Yutaka Sasaki, Ph.D. dissertation, 7–10. 12Ibid., 12–22; Alan Raucher, op. cit., 498–500. 13For details, refer to John N. Thomas, The Institute of Pacific Relations: Asian Scholars and American Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974). 14American IPR, Understanding Asia, 14. 15Yutaka Sasaki, Ph.D. dissertation, 34–35. 16American IPR, Understanding Asia, 15; The I.P.R. Inquiry Series (Brochure, 1940), IPR Fonds-UBCA, box 52-12. 17American Council, The IPR in Wartime: Annual Report of the Secretary of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations (New York: American Council, 1943), 7. 18Ibid., 23. 19Ibid., 8. 20American IPR, Understanding Asia, 15. 21Tomoko Akami, op. cit., 249–254. 22American Council, The IPR in Wartime, 10–11. 23Letter from Robert D. Calkins to Charles Loomis (1943/08/17), IPR Records in the University of Hawai‘i Archives (IPR Records-UHA), E-35/3. 24Pacific Council of the IPR, “Atlantic City Meeting-Report of the Secretary General” (bound volume, 1944), 4-5, IPR Fonds-UBCA, box 54-3.
THE EIGHTH PACIFIC CONFERENCE AND THE KOREAN PROBLEM
The Eighth International Conference of the IPR was held at Mont Tremblant in the Province of Quebec, Canada, from December 4–14, 1942. This Conference was a “great milestone in the history of the IPR.”25 First of all, the meeting was convened at “a crucial stage of the Second World War.”26 Among 131 national delegates from twelve countries, namely Australia (4), Canada (18), China (18), “Fighting France” (4), India (10), Korea (1), Netherlands-Netherlands Indies (13), New Zealand (3), Philippines (4), Thailand (2), United Kingdom (20), and the United States (34), there were many policy-making officials departing from previous IPR conferences.27
The American delegates included Lauchlin Currie (Administrative Assistant to the President of the United States), Stanley K. Hornbeck (Advisor on Political Relations, Department of State), Maxwell M. Hamilton (Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State), C. F. Remer (Chief of the Far Eastern Section, Office of Strategic Services), James H. Shoemaker (Chairman, Board of Review of the Enemy Branch, Board of Economic Warfare), and Elbert D. Thomas (U.S. Senator from Utah, Democrat). The British delegation was led by Lord Hailey, a retired Governor of the Punjab and the United Provinces in India, and the then Chairman of the governing body of the School of Oriental and African Studies. He was “an effective propagandist and a god-send for the defense of the British Empire.” He was engaged in developing the idea of “partnership” between Britain and her dependent territories, as distinct from schemes for some form of international supervision for all colonies. The Chinese delegation consisted of both Chungking and Washington officials as well as scholars. Its chairman was Sao-ke Alfred Sze (Shih Chao-chi, 施肇基), formerly ambassador to London and Washington. They all took part in the conference in a “private” capacity.28
It should also be noted that for the first time an Indian group and a “Free Thai” member attended the conference, and for the first time since 1927 a Korean, Younghill Kang (Kang Yong-hŭl, 姜鏞訖, 1903–1972), attended independently as an observer. His introductory profile was as follows:
Although he was the first Korean writer to be widely known in the American literary world, he had not taken an active part in the Korean nationalist movement in the United States.30 He insisted on two things in the conference. First, in order for the Allies to effectively wage psychological warfare against Japan, they had to give some immediate gesture of recognition to the Korean independence movement. Second, following the principle of the self-determination of peoples of the Atlantic Charter, Korea should obtain complete independence after the war.31
The main theme of the conference was the wartime and postwar cooperation of the United Nations. The round table discussions covered a variety of issues, including the future of colonial dependencies, the treatment of Japan after its defeat, and a broad outline of postwar international organization in the Pacific. Among them, the most contentious issue was how to apply the ideals and principles embodied in the Atlantic Charter to the world, especially to the dependencies of the colonial powers. The Charter, a joint declaration released by the United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill on August 14, 1941, laid the basic democratic principles on which the postwar world would be reconstructed, including collective security, self-determination, disarmament, liberal economic international order, and racial equality. Especially the third article of the Charter, on the subject of sovereign rights and self-government, was interpreted as a challenge to colonial rule. It indicated the need for a new system of governance. China as well as colonies in Asia used it as a strong reference point to argue for equal status with, or independence from, colonial powers.32
On this issue, a sharp conflict of opinions surfaced between the American and British delegates at Mont Tremblant. The American members expressed a considerable degree of suspicion and criticism of British imperial policies in Asia. Tyler Dennett (1883–1949), former historical adviser of the Department of State, emphasized in his memorandum to the conference that the American people would like to see a liquidation of the prewar colonial system and the abandonment of all kinds of imperial preferences. He explained, “the American soldier does not understand that he is fighting to restore to any European colonial power its lost position in Asia. This is a state of mind to be described but not to be argued with. It is just a fact.”33
Under the heavy fire of criticism from members of the United States, Chinese, Canadian, Australian and Indian groups, the British and the Dutch members countered such assertions. For example, in the final plenary session, one Briton asserted that while Article 3 of the Atlantic Charter did not mean granting the immediate and unconditional independence of colonial areas, it did mean that full liberation and independence of colonial areas would be achieved when they arrived at a stage at which they could set up a form of government consistent with “modern ideas of civilization.” To this end, he explained the British government in its colonial policies had already engaged in promoting the growth of self-governing institutions for the dependent areas and felt no hesitation to do anything possible to hasten the process. In short, he emphatically stated that as far as the British were concerned, the days of old imperialism characterized by domination and acquisition were already gone, and that they now had “quite a new concept of imperialism.”34
While decolonization was arising as the most controversial issue, the Korean problem was discussed in relation to the future of the occupied areas of Japan. On this matter, the Chinese group took the lead. According to the rapporteur’s report on “Regional Round Table-Japan,” a Chinese member very explicitly stated China’s position. First, he said, China would ask that Manchuria be returned unconditionally. No international regime was acceptable. Second, Formosa likewise was Chinese from every point of view. It should revert to China with no strings attached. Third, Korea was entitled to complete independence on all counts.35
From these points in the Chinese statement, there was no dissent in the round table except that some debate developed around the future of Korea. The question was raised whether steps were not necessary to assure that an independent Korea, situated as it was in the Northeast Asia triangle, did not become a springboard of attack against China, the Soviet Union or even Japan. It was suggested that Korea was a good place for the United States to assume a mandate. American responsibility for Korea would be the best guarantee of the security of the area―better even than international control.36 (We cannot know who said this because the identity of speakers was not revealed in the reports of discussions. All statements at the conference were made solely on the individual responsibility of the speakers. Therefore, the participants were able to freely express their opinions in the round tables.)
To this, the American members replied: (1) This would be a difficult assignment technically for the United States, to say the least. (2) More importantly, it would be regarded by United States’ public opinion as an extremely retrogressive step. It would look like parceling out colonies among the victors―“straight imperialism.” (3) Independence for Korea was the only course consistent with our war aims, and should be supplemented only by an inter-national guarantee and international aid in rebuilding Korea’s national life if she requested aid, under the auspices of whatever international body emerged in the Pacific area.37
The Korean problem was further discussed in another round table (“Topical Round Table: Political-Military Problems”). At this time there was agreement that Korea must be taken away from Japan. There was further agreement that following a long period of harsh Japanese administration, the country would be found in a very weak condition, clearly unable to stand entirely by itself. It was also the consensus that whatever was done regarding Korea must be done speedily for the purpose of strengthening and rehabilitating the country and its people.38
The proposals for postwar Korea took two directions: the first was that Korea should be assigned to the United States as a mandate—subject, of course, to supervision and inspection by the regional organization. This proposal received rather strong support from some of the Chinese and Canadians present. The second proposal called for a United Nations declaration guaranteeing the independence of Korea immediately after the war and simultaneously guaranteeing her security from outside aggression. It also entailed asserting the willingness of the United Nations to provide any form of assistance Korea might request through the Regional Council. In the event of this solution being adopted, some members believed that the United States might be asked by the Regional Council to play a very prominent role in aiding Korea. The round table, however, did not reconcile these two proposals.39
As is apparent in the summary of the round table discussions above, the crux of the Korean problem was choosing either to allow Korea immediate independence after the war or to implement a mandate over Korea. Concerning this matter, we need to pay attention to two persons, namely, Hugh Byas (1875–1945) and Andrew J. Grajdanzev (1899–?). Byas, former Tokyo correspondent for
In short, Byas justified his argument for Japan’s mandatory role over Korea after the war on the grounds of Korea’s geographical position and the Korean people’s lack of ability of self-government. His views of Korea were reflected in the following British memorandum to the conference: “The United Nations may decide to terminate Japanese control in Korea, but it is difficult to imagine Korea as anything but a very weak and disorderly State for a long time to come and it might become a field for political rivalry between China and Russia.” On the other hand, the paper emphasized that the Korean peasantry under Japanese rule had got the benefit, such as it was, of the improved economic conditions resulting from “the maintenance of peace and order.”42
Grajdanzev, a Russian with long experience in Manchuria and Tientsin and a research associate of the International Secretariat of IPR since 1938,43 refuted Byas’ argument directly in his data paper to the conference, “Memorandum on Politics and Government in Korea.” He pointed out that Byas had reached such a conclusion without attempting to analyze the present situation in Korea. He criticized, “not one line is given to that.” He also insisted that, in the light of the past experience, to give Korea to Japan would amount to giving Japan one more chance of attacking its neighbors. He concluded: “Korea should be an in-dependent state irrespective of the fears or doubts which some Japanese or some Americans may entertain in respect to her geographical position. Negation of such status to Korea would be the most fragrant [flagrant] of any imaginable broken pledges made in this war by the United Nations.”44
What is more interesting is his claim that a newly independent Korea should become “a cooperative commonwealth.” He noted that the fall of the Japanese regime would permit the complete eradication of the social wrongs of the old Korean regime, and that a possible solution for the central problem of Korean reconstruction should be the nationalization of industry and of land, and a great advance in cooperation.45 This argument seems to have reflected a progressive tendency within the International Secretariat of the IPR after the Great Depression.
In the meantime, the Chinese members, having a more profound interest in Korea than most other participants, assumed an ambiguous attitude. For example, S. R. Chow (Zuo Gengsheng, 周鯁生, 1889–1971), professor of international law of Wuhan National University, stated in his paper that there was no reason why this once independent kingdom, with a population of 22 million and a civilization even more ancient than that of the Japanese, should not be given political freedom after Japan’s defeat. Then, he stressed the importance of “a period of tutelage” during which the native peoples of pre-war colonies or dependencies, owing to their political immaturity, would have an opportunity to prepare themselves for self-government.46 His conclusion follows:
As stated above, Chow intimated that Korea would need America’s support for a period of years after the war. Interestingly, Dennett expressed the view in his memorandum to the conference that “probably the United States would do a good deal for Korea.”48 He was suggesting the United States might parallel in Korea its performance in the Philippines, though the process of attaining independence would have to be greatly accelerated. He emphasized that the motives which had once led the United States to retain the Philippines were “philanthropic”. The feeling that they were doing somebody some good sustained Americans’ interest through the years. At the same time, he stressed that the United States had followed, broadly, “a policy of benevolence” toward the nations of the Far East since the middle of the nineteenth century. He wanted to show that the tradition of America’s foreign policy was radically distinct from European imperialism.49
25Letter from Robert D. Calkins to Charles Loomis (1942/12/18), IPR Records-UHA, E-9b/16. 26International Secretariat, IPR ed., War and Peace in the Pacifìc: A Preliminary Report of the Eighth Conference of the Institute of Pacifìc Relations on Wartime and Post-war Cooperation of the United Nations in the Pacific and the Far East, Mont Tremblant, Quebec, December 4–14, 1942 (New York: International Secretariat, IPR, 1943), 1. 27Ibid., Part VI. Conference Membership, 153–162. 28For the composition and characteristics of delegates of each country to the Conference, refer to Yutaka Sasaki, Ph.D. dissertation, 194–206; Christopher G. Thorne, op.cit., 212–214. 29“Revised Who’s Who: Eighth Conference of the Institute of Pacifìc Relations” (Confidential) in the letter from Robert D. Calkins to Charles Loomis (1942/12/18), IPR Records-UHA, E-9b/16, 5. 30Uk-tong Kim, Kang Yong-hŭl: kŭ ŭi sam kwa munhak [Younghill Kang: His life and literature], (Sŏul: Sŏul Taehakkyo Ch’ulp’anbu, 2004), 69–77. 31“Rapporteur’s Report: Plenary Session on Group II Round Tables” (December 9, 1942), IPR Fonds-UBCA, box 51-9, 3, 7. 32Tomoko Akami, op. cit., 266–267; Yutaka Sasaki, Ph.D. dissertation, 183–184. 33Tyler Dennett, Security in the Pacific and the Far East: A Memorandum on Certain American Immediate Post-War Responsibilities (New York: American Council, IPR, 1942), 22, 36. 34International Secretariat, IPR ed., War and Peace in the Pacifìc, 118–120. 35“Rapporteur’s Report: Plenary Session on Group II Round Tables” (December 9, 1942), IPR Fonds-UBCA, box 51-9, 7. The rapporteur was W. W. Lockwood (Secretary, American Council of the IPR). 36Ibid. 37Ibid. 38“Rapporteur’s Report: Plenary Session on Group III Round Tables” (December 12, 1942), 6, IPR Fonds-UBCA, box 51-9. The rapporteur was Frederick V. Field (Chairman, Editorial Board of Amerasia). 39Ibid., 6–7. 40For a short introduction to his life and activities in Japan, refer to Peter B. Oblas, Hugh Byas, A British Editor Who Became a Leading Expert on Japan Between the First and Second World Wars: A Biographical History of a Newspaper Journalist (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2009), “Preface” by John F. Howes. 41Hugh Byas, Government by Assassination (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1942), 359–360. 42“A Prelminary Survey,”Problems of the Post-war Settlement in the Far East: An Interim Report by a Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1942), 2, 9. 43His educational background is as follows: 1899, Born in Ussolye, Siberia, Russia; 1922–23, Polytechnical Institute of Machanics (Irkutsk, Siberia); 1923–24, State University (Irkutsk, Siberia); 1924–28, B.A., M.A., School of Law and Economics (Harbin, Manchuira); 1934–37, Research Worker of the Institute of Economics, Nankai University (Tientsin, China); 1937–38, M.A., University of California (Berkeley); 1939–43, Ph.D., Columbia University (New York). “Project: Study of the Town of Fukaya, Conducted by Dr. A. J. Grad [Grajdanzev]” (1948/05/26), IPR Papers, Rare Books and Manuscript Library, Columbia University, box 315. For details, refer to Ko Chŏng-hyu, “A. J. Kŭrach’ŭtanjep’ŭ wa《Hyŏndae Han’guk》” [A. J. Grajdanzev and Modern Korea], Han’guksa yŏn’gu [The Journal of Korean History], 126 (September 2004). 44Andrew J. Grajdanzev, “Memorandum on Korean Government and Politics,” International Secretariat [of the IPR] Paper No.10 (December 1942), 13, 16. This paper was a preliminary draft of two chapters intended for inclusion in a book, Modern Korea, which was published in the International Research Series of the IPR in 1944. 45Ibid., 20. 46S. R. Chow, “The Pacific after the War,” Foreign Affairs, 21-1 (October 1942), 77–78. Chow expanded this article and submitted a data paper (“A Permanent Order for the Pacific”) to the Mont Tremblant Conference which actually reflected the basic position of the Chinese delegation. 47Ibid., 80. 48Tyler Dennett, Security in the Pacific and the Far East, 28. 49Ibid., 8–11, 15, 18–19.
THE NINTH PACIFIC CONFERENCE AND THE KOREAN PROBLEM
The Ninth International Conference of the IPR was held at Hot Springs, Virginia (United States) from January 5–17, 1945. In the last stage of the Second World War, more than 150 delegates from twelve countries attended the conference.50 Although all the delegations included a majority of non-governmental personnel, both business and academic in character, it was quite clear that in the main all of the groups tended to reflect, in general if not in detail, the official attitudes of their countries on the question at issue.51
According to a confidential report of the U.S. Department of State, the national delegations at the conference differed markedly in the abilities of their members, in the tactics they employed, and in the prominence they assumed in the discussions. The British group was in some respects the strongest, possessing many able members and presenting a solidly united front on most questions. The Chinese delegation was not outstanding. Its members generally presented a united front in formal meetings but appeared to hold divergent and not always clearly thought out opinions on some of the leading problems in personal conversations. The French and the Dutch tended to follow the British lead in the Dependent Areas discussions. The Indian delegation was voluble but generally ineffective. The Korean, “Free Thai,” and Philippine delegations confined themselves as a rule to prepared statements relating directly to their own countries.52
The question of Korean participation in the conference was decided at the Atlantic City meeting of the Pacific Council in January 1944. After that, Secretary General Carter wrote to five Korean organizations in the United Sates and asked them to nominate three qualified Koreans who would be invited to the Hot Springs Conference as observers. In the letter the following was emphasized: “The IPR is desirous that all who attend its Conference should be able to contribute from their own knowledge and experience and also stimulate further investigation and research on Pacific problems. Koreans whose names we would like to have you suggest should therefore have outstanding research experience and recent knowledge of conditions in Korea.”53
The Korean delegation comprised three members: Dr. Henry Chung (Chŏng Han-gyŏng, 鄭翰景, 1890–1985), a member of the Korean Commission in Washington, D.C.; Ilhan New (Yu Ir-han, 柳一韓, 1895–1971), Chairman of Korea Economic Society in New York; and Dunn Jacob Kyuang (Chŏn Kyŏng-mu, 田耕武, 1900–1947), Secretary of Public Relations, United Korean Committee in America. Born in Korea’s northwest region (P’yongan Province) and educated in America since childhood, they were playing an active role in the Korean independence movement during the Pacific War, especially to obtain the United States recognition of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea in exile, which was by this time in Chungking, China. They hoped that the new, postwar Korea would form a government similar to that of the United States.54 They also thought that it would be vital to obtain America’s support and assistance against the potential threat of surrounding powers, especially Soviet Russia.55 (In 1947, Dr. Chung wrote a book,
The agenda of the Hot Springs conference was extremely comprehensive, with the result that almost all Far Eastern current and postwar problems received some measure of attention. Topics which stood out particularly were the treatment of defeated Japan, postwar Far Eastern economic development, the advancement of dependent peoples, and collective security in the Pacific. Decolonization continued to be the most divisive topic among participants. Along with the Chinese and Indian members, many North American members attacked European colonialism. This shocked and angered members from Britain, France, and the Netherlands. European groups were not ready to commit to the self-determination of colonies or to give up their colonial rights. They insisted on the “native’s incompetence to self-govern” and explained colonialism as the “white man’s burden.”56
Regarding Korea, the Cairo Declaration was a reference point for the discussion. The Declaration, released by the United States, Republic of China, and the United Kingdom on December 1, 1943, said that “in due course Korea shall become free and independent.” This obscure phrase attracted considerable attention at the conference. Many questioned how long “in due course” was likely to be. A British member stated:
Contrary to the British view, Korean delegates expressed the hope that Korea would regain full sovereignty in the shortest possible time, not exceeding six months. They emphasized the geographical and cultural homogeneity and economic self-sufficiency of their country as arguments why an independent Korea could be quickly established. It was their belief that their people would, after a very short period, be as well or better qualified for independence than the Filipinos. They conceded that a military government led by foreign countries might be necessary for up to two years, but assured participants a provisional Korean government could be established within six months of the country’s liberation. They also explained that a tutelary government of the Great Powers should not be necessary at all, but, if deemed necessary, should be by several rather than by one or two powers. If a single power was deemed necessary, Korea’s preference was the United States.58
In the round table discussions on collective security, a Korean member stated that his country had two main interests: first, “to get rid of Japanese domination,” and second, to secure international cooperation, particularly by the Great Powers, in establishing Korean independence. In his view, Korean independence required the establishment of an effective international organization. Due to its history and its geographical situation, Korea was vulnerable to aggression. Japan, of course, had to be disarmed, but Korea welcomed the growth of a strong [Nationalist] China. An interim arrangement among the Great Powers in which Korean peace and security could be guaranteed was seen as potentially valuable. Korea, however, did not desire to remain a protégé of the Great Powers. “She wished to stand on her own feet as early as possible.”59
Chinese members, in general, appeared to sympathize with the views of the Korean delegation, but some sided with the British, saying that “the problem is not as simple as our Korean friends would have us think.”60 Before attending the Hot Springs conference, S. R. Chow asserted that many well-informed writers, with full sympathy for the cause of Korea, had expressed doubt about the capacity of the Korean people to sustain full immediate autonomy, especially in view of the fact that they had been under Japanese “enslavement” for nearly forty years. He insisted that there was also substantial agreement even among ardent advocates of Korea’s independence that some sort of interim arrangement for outside assistance to the newly-freed people would be inevitable before they could be safely left to fully govern themselves. He concluded that American assistance, in whatever form, under international supervision would be a much simpler and safer scheme to carry out both for the good of the Korean nation and the interest of world peace.61
Meanwhile, the American delegation had reached agreement on Korea’s postwar status in the preliminary meeting in October 1944:
At the Hot Springs conference an American member suggested that “in due course” might be taken to mean “as soon as an election can be called.” Another member proposed that full Korean independence be recognized, that Korea be encouraged to develop a provisional government as rapidly as possible, and that the United Nations forces in Korea be withdrawn as soon as a provisional government was established.63
In these statements, the American delegation seemed to favor the view of the Korean members. But Dennett, an American authority on the Far East, publicly expressed that a premature recognition of Korean sovereignty might leave it, as in 1882, an object of international rivalries— economic, strategic and ideological—with only the illusion of the security that thus far had been blueprinted. Thus he concluded: “The best that the Koreans could hope for, after the Japanese have been driven out, is a considerable period of international protection, direction, and support, comparable with the earlier stages of the American administration of the Philippines.”64 This argument, in fact, reflected the position of President Roosevelt and the Department of State.
At this point, Grajdanzev’s view of the Korean problem must be considered. In an article published in
As Grajdanzev stated, Soviet Russia had a strong interest in Korea. But it did not participate in the IPR conferences in 1942 and 1945 because of “wartime conditions.”66 At the Hot Springs conference, it was noted that “a full quorum was not present until Russia had given some indication as to its policy on Korea.” A Chinese member expressed the view that Russia’s interest in Korea was similar to that of China, as a neighbor that desires to see peace and prosperity in the peninsular and is willing, in concert with other powers, to take part in some organized form of friendly international assistance. Other participants regarded Russia, though neutral in the Pacific theater of war, as a natural and important member of the regional and world community they envisaged.67
Although the participants at the conference, taken as a whole, expressed their desires for Russia’s positive role in the postwar world, there were underlying fears of its potential threat to their objectives. For example, Chiang Kai-shek had told Lattimore, once his American advisor, that Korea should be a “semi-independent [state] under American and Chinese tutelage” to exclude Russian influence from that peninsula.68 In short, China’s political leaders and intellectuals tried to make an ally of America to maintain the balance of power in Northeast Asia. For this reason S. R. Chow had pushed strongly for America’s “disinterested assistance” for Korea. But President Roosevelt and the Department of Sate disagreed, insisting that isolation of the Russians in the northern part of the Pacific Ocean would create, not relieve, tensions. An international trusteeship, they thought, would be the only way to preempt troubles in postwar Korea and thereby keep intact postwar cooperation among the “Big Four” in Asia and in global affairs.69 Dennett’s aforementioned emphasis on “a considerable period of international protection, direction, and support” was to mean the necessity of the trusteeship over Korea by the Allied powers, including China and Russia.
50International Secretariat, IPR ed., Security in the Pacifìc: A Preliminary Report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacifìc Relations, Hot Springs, Virginia, 6-17, 1945 (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945), Appendix III, Conference Membership. 51Raymond Dennett, “Report on the Ninth Intemational Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations” (1945/04/26, confidential memorandum), IPR Records-UHA, box A-11/11. 52Department of State, U.S., “Minutes of The Hot Springs IPR Conference” (1945/01/25, Confidential), The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China, Volume II, Prepared by the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), 1283. 53E. C. Carter to Korean Commission, United Korean Committee in America, Sino-Korean Peoples’ League, Korean Affairs Institute, Korean Economic Society (1944/10/10), IPR Papers, Columbia University, box 349. 54Henry Chung, Korea and the United States through War and Peace, 1943–1960 (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2000), “Foreword” by Young Ick Lew; Sŏng-gi Cho, Yu Ir-han p’yŏngjŏn [A critical biography of New Ilhan], (Sŏul: Chagŭn Ssiat, 2005). 55Planning and Research Board of the United Korean Committee in America, Condensed Reference: Korea and the Pacific War; a memorandum prepared as a partial plan for more effective participation by the Korean people in the present war and as a guide to an understanding of Korea’s present and post-war problems, her economic status and the capacity of her people to carry on an enlightened and stable self-government (Los Angeles: United Korean Committee in America, 1943), 12, 32–36. 56Tomoko Akami, op. cit., 271–272. 57Department of State, “Minutes of the Hot Springs IPR Conference,” 1283. 58Ibid., 1282–1283. 59Department of State, “Minutes of the Hot Springs IPR Conference,” 1293. 60Ibid., 1283. 61S. R. Chow, Winning the Peace in the Pacific: A Chinese View of Far Eastern Postwar Plans and Requirements for a Stable Security System in the Pacific Area (New York: The Macmillan company, 1944), 42–46. 62“Preliminary Meeting of American Delegation to the 1945 Conference” (1944/10/28, Confidential), IPR Records-UHA, box A-11/4. 63International Secretariat, IPR ed., Security in the Pacifìc, 38. 64Tyler Dennett, “In Due Course,” Far Eastern Survey, 14-1 (January 1945), 3–4. 65A. J. Grajdanzev, “Korea in the Postwar World,” Foreign Affairs, 22-3 (April 1944), 482–483. 66“Minutes of Meeting of the Pacific Council: Hot Springs, Virginia” (1945), IPR Fonds-UBCA,box 54-4, 5. 67International Secretariat, IPR ed., Security in the Pacifìc, 38. 68Xiaoyuan Liu, “Sino-American Diplomacy over Korea during World War II,” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations, 1-2 (Summer 1992), 240. 69Ibid., 251.
Daizaburō Yui (油井大三郞), a professor at Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo, attempted an interesting analysis on the role of American intellectuals in drawing up and implementing reform plans for postwar Japan. According to his book, progressive scholars affiliated with the International Secretariat and the American Council of the IPR during the Pacific War desired “a thorough democratic reform from the bottom up” in postwar Japan. They actually had a direct involvement in the initial reforms of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP),70 such as the release of political prisoners, the abolition of the military and the destruction of armament industries, the encouragement of labor union movements, the dissolution of
Something similar took place in Korea. When Japan was defeated in 1945, the Korean people hoped for complete independence and radical changes in the structure of the Japanese colonial governance, such as the purge of Korean collaborators with Imperial Japan, land reforms, and the nationalization of main industries. It was Grajdanzev, researcher of the International Secretariat of the IPR, who actively spoke on behalf of the Korean people. He believed that the most effective way to dissolve the feudal system or fascism in East Asia was through revolutionary land reforms. He also considered complete dissolution of the Japanese Empire crucial to stabilization and peace in postwar East Asia. His insistence on the establishment of a “centralized democratic republic” in liberated Korea was one way to prevent the revival of Japan as a “New Empire.”72 However, postwar military occupation and administration of Korea by the United States and the Soviet Union made Koreans’ hope of building a sovereign nation state crumble to dust.
China came under the control of the Communists in 1949, and the Korean War broke out in the following year. McCarthyism gained strength in the United States as its foreign policy toward East Asia turned out a failure. The IPR, an aggregate of Asia experts within the United States, became the first victim of this movement. Joseph R. McCarthy, a senator from Wisconsin, criticized Lattimore as “one of the principal architects of our Far Eastern policy” and accused him of pro-Communist leanings.73 Meanwhile, the Internal Security Subcommittee was formed under the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and started an investigation on the IPR. Carter and Lattimore were summoned to testify before the Subcommittee, and Grajdanzev was also called for a closed hearing. He stated at the hearing that he had never been a member of a political party or any group that had a political intention.74 He gave up all his academic activities after the publication of
70The term “Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP)” refers both to the person who embodied that position and the supporting bureaucracy. 71Daizaburō Yui, Mikan no senryō kaikaku: Amerika chishikijin to suterareta Nihon minshuka kōsō [Unfinished occupation reform: American intellectuals and abandonment of the democratization of Japan], (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1989), 241–249, 259–265; Tomoko Akami, op. cit., 259–265. 72Andrew J. Grajdanzev, “Problems of Korean Independence,” Modern Korea, 276–290; “Land Reform in Japan,” Pacific Affairs, 21-2 (June 1948), 115–135. 73Robert Griffith, The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1987), 77. 74Andrew J. Grad to Mr. Holland (1951/8/28, 1952/4/25), IPR Papers, Columbia University, box 265. Grajdanzev changed his name to Grad after the acquisition of American citizenship in the mid-1940s. 75Andrew J. Grad, Land and Peasant in Japan: An Introductory Survey (New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1952); Nihon Taiheiyō Mondai Chōsakai tr., Nihon no tochi to nōmin (Tōkyō: Odosha, 1953).
